Israel is among those states that do not merely employ military power, but also treat the projection of that power—often beyond its measurable dimensions—as an integral instrument of state policy. The reason is readily intelligible. A country with a relatively small population and limited strategic depth must seek to deter its adversaries not solely through the destructive capacity of its weapons, but also through the carefully cultivated perception of military invincibility surrounding them.

Yet strategic projection and military reality are not synonymous. Israel is a formidable military power, but its power is not without limits. Its air force is technologically advanced, its armoured formations are experienced, and its intelligence and precision-guidance capabilities are highly developed. At the same time, a significant portion of its aircraft inventory is ageing, its armoured strength is less extensive than commonly portrayed, and its capacity to sustain a prolonged, multi-front war through national resources alone remains subject to serious constraints.

The F-35I Adir constitutes the most advanced component of the Israeli Air Force. On the basis of publicly available figures, however, Israel currently possesses approximately fifty such aircraft. This is a force of considerable qualitative importance, but not one of sufficient numerical depth to guarantee sustained air supremacy against a major state adversary. Nor can the entire fleet be maintained in operational service at any one time. Maintenance requirements, training rotations, spare-parts availability and combat attrition invariably create a substantial distinction between nominal inventory and immediately deployable strength.

Israel possesses no F-22 aircraft. The United States has never authorised the export of that platform to any foreign state, and no exception has been made for Israel. The frequently projected impression that Israel enjoys an air-superiority capability equivalent to that provided by the F-22 therefore rests not upon an actual inventory of such aircraft, but upon an assessment combining the characteristics of the F-35 with Israel’s sophisticated electronic-warfare capabilities.

The numerical backbone of the Israeli Air Force remains its F-16 fleet. Israel is generally assessed to operate approximately 170 F-16s of several different variants. These aircraft, however, are neither uniform in age nor equivalent in technical standard and operational capability. A proportion of the fleet is already considerably old. Were Israel to retire its F-16s in their entirety, it would lose the numerical body of its combat aviation. Approximately fifty F-35s and some sixty F-15s of various models could not, by themselves, replace the operational volume relinquished with the F-16 fleet.

The F-15 consequently retains a distinct significance in Israel’s long-range operational planning. Although many of these aircraft are ageing, they remain valuable by virtue of their range, endurance and substantial weapons-carrying capacity. This is also the rationale underlying Israel’s procurement of the new F-15IA. Israeli military planners evidently recognise that stealth technology alone cannot satisfy every operational requirement. They continue to require aircraft capable of carrying heavy ordnance, conducting missions over extended distances and remaining on station for prolonged periods.

None of this warrants the underestimation of Israeli air power. Its superiority does not derive from aircraft numbers alone. Pilot training, electronic warfare, aerial intelligence, target acquisition, precision-guided munitions and the capacity to integrate multiple systems within a single operational architecture confer upon Israel a substantial qualitative advantage. Quality, however, cannot indefinitely substitute for quantity. Once aircraft losses accumulate, air bases remain under sustained attack and the supply of spare parts becomes uncertain, even the most technologically advanced air force begins to contract.

The same principle applies to Israel’s armoured formations. The Merkava, with its high degree of protection, advanced electronic systems and Trophy active-protection system, is unquestionably among the world’s most capable main battle tanks. Yet the possession of an excellent tank is not synonymous with the possession of an immense tank army.

Israel’s active armoured strength rests principally upon the 7th, 188th and 401st Armoured Brigades. These are supplemented by the 460th Brigade, primarily assigned a training function, and by reserve formations mobilised in wartime. Public assessments occasionally create the impression of a vast force comprising thousands of immediately deployable tanks. Such totals, however, frequently include older Merkava variants held in storage, vehicles requiring extensive maintenance and tanks that could enter operational service only after mobilisation and reconditioning.

An armoured brigade is not composed of tanks alone. Without trained crews, mechanised infantry, combat engineers, air-defence elements, maintenance and recovery units, fuel supplies and an uninterrupted flow of ammunition, a tank battalion can rapidly be rendered immobile. Consequently, the withdrawal of a tank from storage does not in itself constitute the creation of a combat-ready armoured formation. Qualified personnel must be made available, the entire brigade structure must be assembled, and its logistical system must remain continuously functional.

Operations in Gaza have likewise demonstrated that the Merkava is not invulnerable. Active-protection systems provide a considerable advantage against anti-tank missiles, but mines, improvised explosive devices, unmanned aerial systems and attacks conducted at extremely close range continue to present a serious threat. The Israeli Ministry of Defence’s decision to accelerate the production of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and critical replacement components is not merely an investment in future capacity; it is also a clear indication of the material attrition generated by the present war.

Israel’s fundamental difficulty lies in the absence of unlimited industrial capacity with which to replace sophisticated military systems at short notice. The Merkava and several categories of armoured vehicle are produced domestically. Nevertheless, Israel remains dependent upon foreign supply across a broad spectrum extending from engines and aircraft components to ammunition and electronic systems. Every combat aircraft forming the backbone of its air force is of American origin. As a war becomes prolonged, Israeli military power becomes increasingly dependent upon American supply lines rather than upon Israeli factories alone.

Israel’s actual military weight must therefore be assessed beyond the formal boundaries of its national inventory. Behind the Israel Defense Forces stand American munitions, replacement parts, intelligence, financial assistance and diplomatic protection. If Washington’s support is removed from the equation, what remains is still a technologically sophisticated, highly trained and operationally experienced military. What does not remain is a power capable of sustaining an unlimited regional war for an indefinite period.

Israel’s relations with European and other non-American states cannot fully compensate for this dependency. Germany may provide submarines and defence technology; Britain and certain European governments may extend political support; and military and technological cooperation with India may continue to deepen. An additional security alignment may be constructed in the Eastern Mediterranean through Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration. None of these states, however, can independently replace the financial, military and diplomatic protection afforded by the United States.

At this point, moral judgment and military assessment must be kept analytically distinct. The killing of civilians, women and children in Gaza, and the use of hunger, thirst and forced displacement as instruments of war, cannot be concealed beneath any doctrine of military necessity. This is neither a matter that may be disregarded nor one that should be softened through diplomatic circumlocution. The Israeli government cannot be absolved of the political and legal responsibility arising from its conduct by reciting the technological achievements of its armed forces.

Yet the justified outrage provoked by the devastation of Gaza does not entitle us to portray Israeli military capacity as less substantial than it is. An assessment of power governed by anger is not strategy; it is self-deception. To present Israel as invincible serves its propaganda. To treat it as a weak state that may readily be brought to collapse is no less dangerous. Unequivocally condemning a massacre is one matter; calculating the consequences of war through slogans is quite another.

The conclusion is clear. Israel is neither as powerful as it is often represented nor as weak as its adversaries may wish to believe. Its air and armoured forces are exceptionally effective in short, intensive operations, but remain constrained by manpower, industrial capacity and logistical endurance in a prolonged, multi-front war. The appearance of Israeli invincibility rests not only upon Israel’s own military capabilities, but also upon the uninterrupted support of the United States.

Should that support diminish, Israel would not immediately become defenceless. It would, however, cease to appear as a military giant capable of imposing its will upon the region unaided. What would remain would be a technologically advanced state whose population, geography and productive capacity are all subject to finite limits.

Israel’s power is real. Its invincibility is, to a considerable extent, a carefully preserved myth